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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Christopher Ray Schultz appeals from the Order Granting The State's Motion For 
Summary Disposition. He asserts the district court erred in summarily dismissing his 
petition for post-conviction relief because he presented material issues of fact entitling 
him to an evidentiary hearing on the claim that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel involving the right to remain silent during sentencing evaluations and during the 
plea negotiation process. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Seventeen years old, Christopher Schultz invaded a home with a knife. State v. 
Schultz, Docket No. 33000, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 464, p.1 (May 13, 2008) 
(hereinafter, "Schultz 1',.1 During the invasion, he threatened the women that lived 
there, demanded money from her, and asked to see her breasts. Id. The women 
escaped her home and the police arrested Mr. Schultz a short time later. Id. 
Due to Mr. Schultz's age, the State charged him in juvenile court with the crimes 
of aggravated battery, burglary, robbery, attempted rape, and sentence enhancements 
for using a weapon. Id. at pp.1-2; (R.33000, pp.36-39.) At the waiver hearing, in 
juvenile court, defense counsel said: 
[I]n talking with Christopher and previously talking with the [the 
prosecutor], [the prosecutor] agreed that upon waiver and if Christopher 
ultimately ends up entering a guilty plea to at least some of the charges, 
the State would make a recommendation to the district court judge of a 
sentence not to exceed - and certainly it could be less than this 
depending on negotiations, but not to exceed a 5 year minimum and a 20 
year top on the sentence. 
1 The Schultz I Opinion is attached as Appendix A. 
1 
Id. at 2. (Tr. 10105/2005, p.3, L.23-p.4, L.5.) Mr. Schultz agreed to waive his rights as a 
juvenile and proceed into adult court. (Tr. 10105/2005, p.4, Ls.B-10.) When the district 
court asked Mr. Schultz if this was his agreement on the matter, Mr. Schultz responded 
in the affirmative. (Tr. 10105/2005, p.4, Ls.21-24.) 
The case then proceeded into adult court against the seventeen-year-old. 
(Tr. 10105/2005, p.5, Ls.4-p.6, L.11.) Twelve weeks later, while represented by a 
different defense attorney, Mr. Schultz pled guilty to robbery, attempted rape, and a 
deadly weapon enhancement relating to the rape. Id. at 2. A different prosecutor 
recommended a life sentence with 20 years fixed. (Tr. 03/10106, p.59, L.4-p.60, L.1B.) 
The district court imposed a unified life sentence, with fifteen years fixed, for the 
robbery conviction and a concurrent thirty-year sentence, with fifteen years fixed, for the 
attempted rape and weapons enhancement conviction. (Tr. 03/10106, p.BB, L.23-p.B9, 
L.5; p.90, Ls.5-12; R.33000, pp.73-75, 77-BO.) Mr. Schultz appealed and argued that 
the State breached the plea agreement entered into in juvenile court. (R., p.B6.) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals stated, 
the transcript of the trial court proceedings presents two clear and 
unequivocal, but entirely contradictory, agreements pertaining to the 
sentence recommendation that the State would make if Schultz pleaded 
guilty. Nothing in the record explains or reconciles this disparity. It may 
be, as the State argues, that the first agreement was abandoned or 
deemed never to have been activated because Schultz did not plead guilty 
immediately thereafter, but the record does not disclose that. 
Schultz I, at 3. The Schultz I Court declined to resolve the ambiguity between the two 
agreements and concluded that the record was insufficient for appellate review, 
however, determined that Mr. Schultz's claim was preserved without prejudice allowing 
Mr. Schultz the opportunity to pursue his claim. Id. at 3-4. 
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Mr. Schultz attempted to resolve the dispute by following the court's suggestion 
and filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the state had breached its plea 
agreement. State v. Schultz, 150 Idaho 97,99 (Ct. App. 2010) (hereinafter, "Schultz 
11").2 The district court concluded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the agreement 
at the waiver hearing was preliminary in nature and that no meeting of the minds 
occurred. Schultz /I, 150 Idaho at 99, 101. Schultz /I noted that the defendant failed to 
file a motion seeking enforcement of the earlier "agreement" and that no one disclosed 
the earlier agreement to the district court. Id. at 103. Moreover, the Schultz /I Court felt 
that the "agreement" first came to light due to appellate counsel raising the issue for the 
first time in Mr. Schultz's direct appeal. Id. 
Before the opinion in Schultz /I had been released, Mr. Schultz filed a timely 
Petition And Affidavit For Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp.8-13.) He asserted that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel, his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteen Amendments 
were violated, and the prosecutor committed misconduct. (R., p.9.) Mr. Schultz 
attempted to elaborate on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, providing that his 
attorney failed to advise him of his rights against self incrimination, failed to make 
himself available during all phases of the criminal process, improperly coerced him into 
pleading guilty, and failed to properly secure an agreement between him and the State. 
(R., pp.10-11.) Mr. Schultz sought a new sentencing hearing. (R., p.11.) Additionally, 
he requested suppression of certain evaluations and/or statements made during the 
course of his evaluations. (R., p.11.) 
2 The Schultz /I Opinion is attached as Appendix B. 
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The State filed an answer. (R., pp.38-40.) It also requested that the district court 
take judicial notice of the proceedings of the file and contents pertaining to the criminal 
case, including opinions, decisions, and transcripts. (R., pp.52-53, 61.) The State 
moved for dismissal, arguing that Mr. Schultz's claims were too bare, conclusory, or 
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding either deficient performance or 
resulting prejudice. (R., p.54.) Alternatively, the State asserted that the claims should 
have been raised on direct appeal. (R., p.54.) 
In seeking to have a dismissal, the State argued the following: 
Schultz alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
during the defense of his case. A large portion of Schultz's assertions 
against his attorneys is not ripe for review. Schultz asserts multiple 
challenges against the attorneys who represented him in Juvenile Court 
and District Court. The State asserts that many of those challenges share 
at .Ieast one thing in common: they all assume there was a plea 
agreement made in Juvenile Court. However, in denying Schultz's motion 
to withdraw his plea in his underlying criminal case, this Court ruled that 
there was no agreement at the Juvenile Court level. In State v. Schultz, 
20120 WL 3034266 (Ct. App. 2010), the Court of Appeals of Idaho upheld 
this Court's decision. Schultz cannot use a non-existent agreement to 
assert claims against his attorneys. Therefore, those portions of Schultz's 
petition which assume the existence of a plea agreement from the 
Juvenile Court proceeding should be summarily dismissed. 
(R., p.61.) Additionally, the State sought dismissal of the petition because in their 
opinion either the record disproved Mr. Schultz's claims or the claims were bare and 
cone/usory. (R., pp.61-63.) 
The district court agreed with the State and found that Mr. Schultz's claims were 
bare and conclusory failing to satisfy the standard necessary to demonstrate ineffective 
assistance of counsel. (R., p.89.) Therefore, the court granted the state's motion for 
summary dismissal finding that no genuine issue of material fact existed. (R., pp.85-
92.) Mr. Schultz filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.93-95.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Schultz's claims that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Schultz's Claims That He 
Received Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Schultz asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Schultz presented a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether his attorney failed to advise him about his right to remain 
silent during his evaluations and that any statements made to the evaluators would be 
used against him. Additionally, his attorneys failed to adequately inform him about a 
plea agreement that would have resulted in a sentencing limitation being placed on the 
State during the sentencing hearing. Mr. Schultz respectfully requests that the district 
court's order summarily dismissing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims be 
vacated, and this case remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
1. Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The United States Constitution "guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process 
Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several 
provisions of the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 
(1984). One such provision is the right to the assistance of counsel, (U.S. Const. 
amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense.")), which has been interpreted as the right to 
the effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-86. 
6 
There is a two-pronged test for determining whether an attorney has rendered 
ineffective assistance in contravention of a criminal defendant's right to counsel. The 
threshold inquiry is whether counsel's performance was "deficient," i.e., whether it "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness," as judged "under prevailing 
professional norms." Id. at 687-91. Assuming there has been deficient performance, 
the next inquiry is whether that deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 
687, 691-96. In order to establish "prejudice," it need not be shown "that counsel's 
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case" since the "result 
of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, 
even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to 
have determined the outcome." Id. at 693-94. Instead, it need only be shown "that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. 
2. Petitions For Post-Conviction Relief 
In this case, Mr. Schultz has alleged ineffective assistance through a petition for 
post-conviction relief. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is 
separate and distinct from the underlying criminal action which led to the petitioner's 
conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,456 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed 
by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to 
-4911) and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456. Because it is 
a civil proceeding, the petitioner must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813,816 (Ct. App. 1995). However, the petition 
initiating a post-conviction proceeding differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. 
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A post-conviction petition is required to include more than "a short and plain statement 
of the claim"; it "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of 
the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must 
be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not 
attached." Id.; I.C. § 19-4903. "In other words, the application must present or be 
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will 
be subject to dismissal." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the 
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of post-conviction petitions where there are no 
genuine issues as to any material facts and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. I.C. § 19-4906(c).3 In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, 
the district court need not "accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez, 
126 Idaho at 816-17. However, if the petitioner presents any evidentiary support for his 
allegations, the district court must take the petitioner's allegations as true, at least until 
such time as they are controverted by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 
(1968). This is so even if the allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. Thus, only 
after the State controverts the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the 
evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982). But in doing so, it must 
3 Although this standard is set forth in section 19-4906(b), which deals with motions for 
summary disposition, it appears to apply to sua sponte dismissals as well. See, e.g., 
Small, 132 Idaho at 331 (discussing the standard for summary disposition under section 
19-4906 generally as being whether a genuine issue of material fact has been 
presented). 
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still liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner, 
Small, 132 Idaho at 331.4 
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve that question. Small, 132 Idaho at 331. If there is no 
question of fact, and if the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can 
be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State's motion. I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c). 
Applying these standards to Mr. Schultz's case, it ought to be apparent (for the 
reasons stated in detail below) that the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
Mr. Schultz's petition in its entirety. 
3. Standard Of Review On Appeal 
In this case, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Schultz's petition for post-
conviction relief. Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition will never 
involve the finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only 
determinations of law. Accordingly, this Court must review a district court's summary 
dismissal order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401,402-03 (2006). 
C. The Evidence Is Sufficient To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To 
Whether Mr. Schultz Received Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel When His 
Attorney Failed To Advise Him About His Right To Remain Silent During The 
Psychological, Psychosexual, Or Social Sexual Evaluations 
As noted, the question of whether summary disposition is warranted turns on 
whether there is evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to a 
matter which, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to post-
4 The district court need not accept those of the petitioner's allegations which are 
"clearly disproved by the record." Coontz v. State, 129 Idaho 360,368 (Ct. App. 1996). 
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conviction relief. Thus, when it comes to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, in 
order for the petitioner to withstand summary dismissal, he must be able to point to 
evidence sufficient to raise questions concerning whether his counsel rendered deficient 
performance and whether such deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner in his 
criminal case. 
In Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court held that: a 
psychosexual evaluation is a critical stage of a criminal proceeding, such that the 
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel during 
that stage of the proceeding, Estrada, 143 Idaho at 561-63; the defendant has a Fifth 
Amendment right to silence during a psychosexual evaluation, id. at 563-64; and the 
failure of counsel to advise the defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to silence and 
advise him as to whether he should waive that right and submit to the psychosexual 
evaluation may constitute deficient performance and ineffective assistance of counsel, 
id. at 562-63, 564. On the latter point, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically held that "a 
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding ... the decision of 
whether to submit to a psychosexual exam. . .. Estrada does have a right to at least 
the advice of counsel regarding his participation in the psychosexual evaluation ... ," 
Id. at 562-63. Thus, it is clear that effective assistance of counsel not only includes 
informing the defendant of his Fifth Amendment right to silence during his psychosexual 
evaluation, but also competent advice as to whether he should invoke that right. Id. 
Ct, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966) (recognizing that even after 
one has been advised of his right to silence, he still may benefit from the guiding hand 
of counsel); Von Maltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948) (holding that a criminal 
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defendant is not only entitled to know what her plea choices are, but also advice from 
her counsel concerning what plea should actually be entered). 
Mr. Schultz asserted that he was not advised of his rights against self-
incrimination. (R., p.10.) Moreover, that his attorney was not available during all 
phases of sentencing. (R., p.10.) He requested that a new sentencing hearing be held 
without the use of the highly prejudicial psychological, psychosexual, and social sexual 
evaluations. (R., p.10.) Mr. Schultz's attached an affidavit that made clear that he was 
asserting an Estrada type claim. (R., pp.14-15.) Specifically he asserted, 
due to his youthfull [sic] age at the time of sentencing and the facts that he 
was not adequately represented by counsel during these proceedings his 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated during the 
sentencing phases of the court proceedings and resulted in a[n] erroneous 
and highly prejudicial bias that resulted in a much higher sentence being 
imposed. 
(R., p.14.) Additionally, Mr. Schultz asserted, 
he was never fully advised of his rights against self incrimination or his 
Fifth Amendment rights against self incrimination that may result from any 
or all information he mayor may not disclose during any psychological, 
psychosexual, or social sexual evaluations. Including the pre-sentence 
investigation or examination and interviews that were all conducted 
without the presence or advice from counsel to plaintiff. 
(R., p.15.) Mr. Schultz also preemptory filed a brief in response to a motion to dismiss.5 
(R., pp.16-26.) 
Mr. Schultz presented a material issue of fact that his attorney failed to advise 
him about his right to remain silent during the prejudicial evaluations that resulted in a 
more harsh sentence. The district court claimed that Mr. Schultz failed to "provide the 
court with any discernible details regarding how his rights were alleged violated .... " 
5 The State had not filed a motion to dismiss as of May 1 0, 2010. (R., p.6.) 
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(R., pp.89-90.) Reading the petition liberally and in his favor, the facts are simple: had 
counsel correctly advised Mr. Schultz to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights and not 
participate in the court-ordered (non-privileged) evaluation, Mr. Schultz presumably 
would have followed that advice and the extremely prejudicial evaluations would not 
have been considered by the district court at sentencing. The district court erred when 
it summarily dismissed this claim because it believed the claim was bare and 
conclusory. (R., pp.89-90.) 
D. The Evidence Is Sufficient To Raise A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To 
Whether Mr. Schultz Received Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel During The 
Plea Negotiation Process 
As noted, the question of whether summary disposition is warranted turns on 
whether there is evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to a 
matter which, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to post-
conviction relief. Thus, when it comes to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, in 
order for the petitioner to withstand summary dismissal, he must be able to point to 
evidence sufficient to raise questions concerning whether his counsel rendered deficient 
performance and whether such deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner in his 
criminal case. Here, Mr. Schultz asserts that he raised a genuine issue of material fact 
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea negotiation process. 
"In today's criminal justice system, ... the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather 
than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a defendant." 
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012). "Criminal defendants require effective 
counsel during plea negotiations. "Anything less ... might deny a defendant 'effective 
representation by counsel at the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him.' " 
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Id. at 1407-08 (quoting, Massiah, 377 U.S., at 204, 84 S.Ct. 1199 (quoting Spano v. 
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265 (1959) (Douglas, J., 
concurring))). In March of this year, the United States Supreme Court held, that as a 
general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers 
from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be 
favorable to the accused. Any exceptions to that rule need not be 
explored here, for the offer was a formal one with a fixed expiration date. 
When defense counsel allowed the offer to expire without advising the 
defendant or allowing him to consider it, defense counsel did not render 
the effective assistance the Constitution requires. 
Id. at 1408. 
The Frye Court found that the defendant received deficient performance during 
the plea negotiation process because the attorney failed to convey the State's offer to 
him. Id. at 1409. The Court continued to set clear standards to prove whether the 
defendant had been prejudiced by the deficient performance. Id. The Court stated, 
To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where a plea 
offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel's deficient 
performance, defendants must demonstrate a reasonable probability they 
would have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been afforded 
effective assistance of counsel. Defendants must also demonstrate a 
reasonable probability the plea would have been entered without the 
prosecution canceling it or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they had 
the authority to exercise that discretion under state law. To establish 
prejudice in this instance, it is necessary to show a reasonable probability 
that the end result of the criminal process would have been more 
favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less 
prison time. Cf. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203, 121 S.Ct. 696, 
148 L.Ed.2d 604 (2001) ("[A]ny amount of [additional] jail time has Sixth 
Amendment significance"). 
Id. Moreover, like in this case, "where a defendant pleads guilty to less favorable terms 
and claims that ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to miss out on a more 
favorable earlier plea offer," the defendant must demonstrate that he would have 
accepted the earlier terms of the proposed agreement. Id. at 1410. The Court added 
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that the defendant must also demonstrate that the prosecutor would not have cancelled 
the offer prior to it being accepted and the court would not have rejected it. Id. 
In the instant case, Mr. Schultz has alleged that his attorneys failed to 
communicate with each other, failed to communicate with the district court, and failed to 
convey the offer properly to him. (R., pp.B-12, 15.) It is clear from the two prior 
opinions involving Mr. Schultz's case that some semblance of an offer had been 
discussed between the State and Mr. Schultz's attorney while he was in the juvenile 
court. It is undisputed that the following negotiation was placed on the record with the 
prosecutor being present: 
[I]n talking with Christopher and previously talking with the [the 
prosecutor], [the prosecutor] agreed that upon waiver and if Christopher 
ultimately ends up entering a guilty plea to at least some of the charges, 
the State would make a recommendation to the district court judge of a 
sentence not to exceed - and certainly it could be less than this 
depending on negotiations, but not to exceed a 5 year minimum and a 20 
year top on the sentence. 
Schultz I, 200B Unpublished Opinion No. 464, at p.2. (Tr. 10105/2005, p.3, L.23-pA, 
L.5.) In Mr. Schultz' second appeal, he sought relief from what he believed was the 
prosecutor's failure to abide by this agreement. Schultz II, 150 Idaho at 99. The 
Schultz 1/ Court concluded that there was no meeting of the minds. Id. Mr. Schultz filed 
his post-conviction matter asserting that it was his attorneys, both the juvenile and adult 
court attorneys, that failed him because they did not properly convey the agreement to 
him or enforce the same to the court. (R., pp.B-12, 15.) The Schultz /I Court also 
indicated that two additional terms existed that required Mr. Schultz to waive the 
preliminary hearing and to plead guilty at the arraignment. Id. at 101. A liberal reading 
of Mr. Schultz' petition and the record before the district court revealed that a material 
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issue of fact existed that Mr. Schultz received ineffective assistance of counsel during 
the plea negotiating process. Specifically, whether Mr. Schultz had been properly 
advised of all the terms of the agreement, would he have plead guilty to the more 
favorable terms. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408. 
Here, Mr. Schultz demonstrated resulting prejudice from the deficient 
performance because the prosecutor recommended a more severe sentence then the 
one that they would have recommended under the failed agreement. Additionally, the 
district court imposed a more harsher agreement then the one that had been 
contemplated under the original agreement. Therefore, on the face of Mr. Schultz's 
claims he demonstrated a material issue of fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Schultz respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order summarily 
dismissing his post-conviction petition and remand the matter for further proceedings. 
DATED this th day of May, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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LANSING, Judge 
Christopher Ray Schultz appeals his convictions and sentences for robbery and attempted 
rape with a sentence enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. He contends that the State 
breached a plea agreement and that the district court imposed excessive sentences. 
I. 
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Armed with a knife, seventeen-year-old Schultz invaded the home of a woman who lived 
in the apartment below Schultz's estranged wife's residence. He had planned in advance to 
invade the home once the victim's husband left, with the intent of raping her. Once inside, he 
held the knife to the victim's throat and demanded money. He also demanded that she show him 
her breasts. The victim was able to flee and alert the police, who arrested Schultz a short time 
later. Schultz was charged with aggravated battery, Idaho Code §§ 18-903(a), -907(b); burglary, 
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I.e. § 18-1401; robbery, I.C. §§ 18-6501, -6502; attempted rape, I.C. §§ 18-6101, -306; and four 
sentence enhancements were alleged for using a deadly weapon in the commission of those 
crimes, I.e. § 19-2520. 
Because Schultz was a minor when he committed these crimes, he initially appeared in 
juvenile court. At that proceeding, defense counsel said: 
[I]n talking with Christopher and previously talking with [the prosecutor], [the 
prosecutor] agreed that upon waiver [to adult court] and if Christopher ultimately 
ends up entering a guilty plea to at least some of the charges, the State would 
make a recommendation to the district court judge of a sentence not to exceed--
and certainly it could be less than this depending on negotiations, but not to 
exceed a 5 year minimum and a 20 year top on the sentence. 
Schultz agreed to be waived into adult court at that hearing. Twelve weeks later, however, when 
Schultz pleaded guilty to robbery, attempted rape, and the deadly weapon enhancement relating 
to the rape, the prosecutor expressed the plea agreement as calling for the State to "recommend a 
sentence of 20 years fixed, and then it's free to recommend up to the maximum for an 
indeterminate period of time. And I guess another way of saying that is that the state can 
recommend up to 20 to life in this case." Defense counsel agreed that these were the terms and 
clarified that "the defendant will be free to recommend whatever sentence he feels is appropriate 
at the time of sentencing. This is certainly not a stipulated sentence." Counsel also noted that 
the State had agreed not to charge Schultz with attempted murder. The Court restated that the 
State could recommend a sentence of twenty years to life, and Schultz indicated that this was his 
understanding of the plea agreement. The State made this sentencing recommendation. The 
district court imposed a unified life sentence with fifteen years determinate for robbery; and a 
unified thirty-year sentence with fifteen years determinate for attempted rape with the weapons 
enhancement. The district court ordered that the sentences run concurrently. Schultz now 




A. The Record is Insufficient for Appellate Review of the Alleged Breach of the Plea 
Agreement 
Schultz argues that by recommending a sentence in excess of twenty years in 
contravention of the agreement put on the record in the hearing on waiver to adult court, the 
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State breached that agreement. In that waiver hearing conducted in juvenile court, defense 
counsel indicated that in exchange for Schultz's waiver into adult court, the State agreed to 
recommend a determinate term of not more than five years and an indeterminate term not 
exceeding twenty years in the event that Schultz ultimately pleaded guilty. At the change of plea 
hearing twelve weeks later, however, the defendant himself agreed that the State could 
recommend a sentence of twenty years to life. Schultz made no objection to the State's ultimate 
recommendation below, nor did he file a motion to withdraw his plea. 
The fact that Schultz did not object to the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation or 
otherwise claim a prosecutorial breach of the plea agreement in the trial court does not, in itself, 
preclude consideration of the issue on appeal. It is generally true that if a party does not raise an 
issue before the trial court, that issue is waived for purposes of appeal. State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 
192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Nevertheless, because a breach of a plea agreement is 
fundamental error, a claim of such a breach may be considered for the first time on appeal if the 
record provided is sufficient for that purpose. State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 775, 102 P.3d 380, 
382 (et. App. 2004); State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 301, 77 P.3d 988, 990 (et. App. 2003); State 
v. Brooke, 134 Idaho 807, 809, 10 P.3d 756,758 (et. App. 2000); State v. Kellis, 129 Idaho 730, 
734, 932 P.2d 358, 362 (et. App. 1997). An appellate court can know only what is revealed on 
the record and it is therefore incumbent upon the respective attorneys to clearly and 
unambiguously state the entire plea agreement on the record. State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 271, 
141 P.3d 1136, 1140 (et. App. 2006). We have said that when a prosecutorial promise is 
disputed and the record on appeal does not clearly disclose the terms of the plea agreement, 
appellate review is not possible. See Kellis, 129 Idaho at 734, 932 P.2d at 362; State v. 
Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 914, 693 P.2d 1112, 1116 (et. App. 1985). 
In this case, the transcript of the trial court proceedings presents two clear and 
unequivocal, but entirely contradictory, agreements pertaining to the sentence recommendation 
that the State would make if Schultz pleaded guilty. Nothing in the record explains or reconciles 
this disparity. It may be, as the State argues, that the first agreement was abandoned or deemed 
never to have been activated because Schultz did not plead guilty immediately thereafter, but the 
record does not disclose that. As we said in State v. Lenon, 143 Idaho 415, 418, 146 P.3d 681, 
684 (et. App. 2005), "although claims of breach of a plea agreement may be heard initially on 
appeal with a less-than-fully-developed record, there is a preference for a complete record 
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developed in the trial court." Here, the ambiguity in the record could have been resolved if 
Schultz had filed a motion in the trial court seeking relief for the State's alleged breach of 
agreement. On the existing record the ambiguity is such that we decline to address Schultz's 
claim of prosecutorial breach. The claim is preserved without prejudice to Schultz's opportunity 
to pursue the matter through appropriate proceedings in the trial court should he wish to do so. 
B. Sentence Review 
Schultz also contends that the sentence imposed in this case was excessive, particularly in 
light of his youth, his level of intelligence, his first-time felony offender status, and his family 
support. Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. When a sentence is challenged on 
appeal, we examine the record, focusing upon the nature of the offense and the character of the 
offender, to determine if there has been an abuse of the sentencing court's discretion. State v. 
Young, 119 Idaho 510, 511, 808 P.2d 429, 430 (Ct. App. 1991). The defendant bears the burden 
to show that the sentence is unreasonably harsh in light of the primary objective of protecting 
society and the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. State v. To oh ill, 103 
Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, 
we consider the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 
391 (2007). An abuse of discretion will be found only if, in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 
497, 500, 861 P.2d 67, 70 (1993). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the length of the 
sentence, we will not substitute our view for that of the district court. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 
385,393,825 P.2d 482,490 (1992); State v. Admyers, 122 Idaho 107, 108,831 P.2d 949,950 
(Ct. App. 1992). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we 
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion. Therefore, Schultz's judgment of 
conviction and sentence are affirmed. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The record is insufficient for appellate review of Schultz's contention that the State 
breached the plea agreement. We affirm the sentence imposed by the district court. 
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge PERRY CONCUR. 
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PERRY, Judge Pro Tern 
Christopher R. Schultz pleaded guilty to robbery and attempted rape with a sentence 
enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. The district court denied Schultz's post-sentencing 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, brought on the theory that the state had breached a plea 
agreement with regard to its sentencing recommendations. We affirm. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This is the second time this case has come before this Court. While at his estranged 
wife's residence in violation of a no-contact order, then seventeen-year-old Schultz told a friend 
of his plan to invade the home of a woman who lived in the apartment below in order to rape and 
kill her. Armed with a knife and wearing a self-fashioned mask and gloves, he waited until the 
victim's husband left and then forced his way into the apartment. Once inside, he held the knife 
to the victim's throat and demanded money. He also demanded that she show him her breasts. 
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The victim distracted Schultz by throwing her purse at him, fled the apartment, and called the 
police. Schultz also fled, taking the victim's purse with him. Schultz was alTested a short time 
later. 
The state filed a petition under the Juvenile COlTections Act charging Schultz with four 
felonies: battery with the intent to commit a serious felony (rape), burglary, robbery, and 
attempted rape. Four sentence enhancements were alleged for using a deadly weapon in the 
commission of those crimes. Seeking to prosecute Shultz as an adult, along with the petition, the 
prosecution filed a motion to waive juvenile jurisdiction. l At the waiver hearing proceeding 
before a magistrate judge, defense counsel stated: 
[I]n talking with Christopher [Schultz] and previously talking with [prosecutor] 
Mr. Schneider, Mr. Schneider agreed that upon waiver [to adult court] and if 
Christopher ultimately ends up entering a guilty plea to at least some of the 
charges, the State would make a recommendation to the district court judge of a 
sentence not to exceed--and certainly it could be less than this depending on 
negotiations, but not to exceed a five-year minimum and a 20 year top on the 
sentence. 
Certainly, without admitting any of the facts or the allegations in this 
matter, but after reviewing the report with Christopher, he is prepared to waive his 
rights as a juvenile and proceed into adult court. He realizes his situation is such 
that celiainly it's very likely that he would be waived, and, therefore, he's willing 
to waive into the adult system, your Honor. 
The deputy prosecutor did not respond to defense counsel's statement. After considering 
the factors enumerated in Idaho Code Section 20-508(8), in addition to Schultz's stipulation, the 
magistrate found that waiver of juvenile jurisdiction was warranted and entered an order to that 
effect. The matter then proceeded in accord with an adult criminal prosecution. Specifically, the 
prosecution filed a complaint in magistrate court, Schultz made an initial appearance before a 
magistrate, and a magistrate conducted a preliminary hearing. After Schultz was bound over to 
district court, he pleaded not guilty at the alTaignment and a trial date was set. As per the 
practice of the respective offices, the prosecutor and the defense counsel that attended the 
juvenile proceeding no longer handled the case; instead, a different felony prosecutor and 
defense counsel were assigned. 
On the day the jury trial was set to commence, a plea agreement was placed on the record 
before the district court. The agreement called for Schultz to enter a guilty plea to the robbery 
See I.C. §§ 20-508, 20-509,1-2208(4); Idaho Juvenile Rule 26. 
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charge, an Alford2 guilty plea to the attempted rape charge, and to plead guilty to the deadly 
weapon enhancement attendant to the attempted rape charge, with the remaining charges to be 
dismissed. The agreement further provided that the prosecution would recommend twenty-year 
fixed sentences, that it could recommend up to the maximum indeterminate sentences on both 
charges, and that the defense was free to recommend any sentence thought appropriate. When 
questioned by the trial court, Schultz indicated that this was his understanding of the plea 
agreement. 
At sentencing, the prosecution recommended a unified life sentence, with twenty years 
fixed, for robbery and a concurrent unified thirty-year sentence, with twenty years fixed, for 
attempted rape with the weapon enhancement. The defense asked for significantly lesser 
sentences and requested retained jurisdiction. The district court imposed a unified life sentence, 
with fifteen years fixed, for robbery and a concurrent unified thirty-year sentence, with fifteen 
years fixed, for attempted rape with the weapon enhancement. 
Schultz appealed from the judgment of conviction and the case was assigned to this 
Court. On appeal, Schultz raised an issue that had not been preserved by objection below. He 
argued that fundamental error occurred because the "plea agreement" outlined by defense. 
counsel at the juvenile waiver hearing was final and binding on the state and that the state's 
ultimate sentencing recommendation breached its terms. This Court, deeming the record 
inadequate to resolve the issue, declined to decide which of the two plea agreements controlled. 
State v. Schultz, Docket No. 33000 (Ct. App. May 13,2008) (unpublished). We also specifically 
noted that Schultz could pursue his claim through appropriate proceedings in the trial court 
should he choose to do so. On the other issue presented, this Court affirmed the district court's 
sentences. 
After Schultz I was issued, Schultz filed a motion with the trial court seeking to withdraw 
his guilty pleas. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion, holding, 
among other things, that the plea "agreement" referred to by defense counsel at the waiver 
hearing was preliminary in nature and that no meeting of the minds occurred until the final plea 
agreement was reached later in the district court. Schultz appeals. 
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II. 
See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement 
of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 
257, 262, 92 S. Ct. 495, 499, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 433 (1971). "Whether a plea 
agreement has been breached is a question of law to be reviewed by this Court de 
novo, in accordance with contract law standards." State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 
73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005) (citing United States v. Bunner, 134 F.3d 1000, 
1003 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also Puckett v. [United States], ---U.S. ----, ----, 129 
S. Ct. 1423, 1430, 173 L. Ed. 2d 266, 276 (2009) ("[P]lea bargains are essentially 
contracts. When the consideration for a contract fails--this is, when one of the 
exchanged promises is not kept--... we say that the contract was broken."). 
In determining whether the State has breached a plea agreement a court 
must examine the language of the plea agreement, and where the language of that 
plea agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities shall be resolved in favor of the 
defendant. State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 745, 52 P.3d 886, 890 (Ct. App. 
2002). "The burden of proving the existence of a contract and the fact of its 
breach is upon the plaintiff." O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796, 813, 810 P.2d 
1082, 1099 (1991); see also Johnson v. Nasi, 50 Wash. 2d 87, 309 P.2d 380, 382 
(1957) ("The burden of proving a contract, whether express or implied, is on the 
party asserting it, and he must prove each essential fact, including the existence of 
a mutual intention. "). 
The determination that a plea agreement is ambiguous is a question of law; 
however, interpretation of an ambiguous term is a question of fact. State v. Allen, 
143 Idaho 267, 272, 141 P.3d 1136, 1141 (et. App. 2006). Factual 
determinations made by a trial court shall not be set aside on review unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Bramwell v. S. Rigby Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 650, 39 
P.3d 588,590 (2001). 
State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595,226 P.3d 535,537 (2010). 
III. 
ANALYSIS 
Schultz asserts that the "plea agreement" set forth on the record in front of a magistrate 
judge was complete in its terms, and therefore it was final and binding on the district court and 
the prosecutor at the felony sentencing. In support of his position, he relies heavily on our 
Supreme Court's opinion in Peterson. In that case, the defendant was arrested and initially 
charged with a number of offenses all stemming from one incident, including one felony drug 
charge. At the preliminary hearing on the felony charge, the prosecution moved for a 
continuance because the lab testing on the substance had not been completed. The magistrate 
denied the motion and dismissed the charge, telling the prosecutor that the charge could be re-
filed as a new complaint if a lab report was obtained. This was done, but the new felony 
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complaint and the original complaint, which now contained only two misdemeanor charges, were 
not joined for trial but instead remained separate. At a plea hearing before a magistrate, Peterson 
entered into an oral plea bargain wherein he pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor with an agreed-
upon sentence of six months probation and the other misdemeanor was dismissed. During the 
hearing, defense counsel also said: 
Your Honor, I just want to make sure that everybody knows-this all came from a 
bunch of different charges and things, and this will resolve this entire case, just in 
case we don't think it does. I assume it would automatically, but I just wanted to 
put that on the record. 
The prosecutor said nothing to dispute this articulation, the plea bargain was accepted by the 
magistrate, and Petersen was sentenced. 
After Peterson completed his misdemeanor probation, the state pursued the felony drug 
charge. Peterson moved to dismiss, contending that the charge had been disposed of by the plea 
agreement. The district cOUli denied the motion, but on appeal from the defendant's subsequent 
conviction our Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that Peterson met his burden of proving 
the existence and content of the plea agreement, that ambiguities regarding the content of a plea 
agreement are to be interpreted in favor of the defendant, and that while the general rule is that 
silence does not constitute acceptance of an offer, that the case fell outside of the general rule. 
Id. at 596-97,226 P.3d at 538-39. Specifically, the Court said: 
The record shows that Peterson, as the party attempting to enforce the 
contract, met his burden of proving the existence and content of that contract 
through the introduction of the transcript of the December 1, 2003, plea hearing, 
wherein Peterson's counsel recited the terms of the plea agreement, such terms 
being agreed to by the State, and then offered his clarifying statement of the scope 
of the agreement, with no objection or response from the State. The record before 
us demonstrates that Peterson understood the plea agreement to be in resolution of 
all charges arising from his August 20, 2003, arrest. Following Peterson's 
counsel's clarifying statement, the prosecutor stood silent. Based upon the facts 
of this case, where both the prosecution and defense have assented to entry of the 
plea agreement contract, and where, immediately following the court's acceptance 
of the plea agreement, defense counsel proffers a description of the scope of the 
plea agreement, said description differing from what the prosecutor understands 
the agreement to encompass, the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to dispute the 
defendant's representation of the scope of the plea agreement, or to ask for further 
time to clarify the agreement. Otherwise silence shall be interpreted as 
acceptance of the stated terms. 
Here the prosecution understood what Peterson believed the plea 
agreement to be, and took the benefit of that contract in allowing Peterson to 
5 
plead guilty and complete his probation. Having taken that benefit with the 
knowledge that Peterson believed the guilty plea was in resolution of all charges 
arising from the August 20, 2003, arrest, the prosecution cannot now deny 
Peterson his benefits under that contract. As was noted by the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1234 (9th Cir. 1980), in 
some cases the duty of the prosecutor to act in good faith throughout the plea 
bargaining phase includes an obligation to inform the defendant of other charges 
which may be filed. In light of the fact that the felony charge had previously been 
dismissed, and the statement made by Peterson's counsel about the scope of the 
plea agreement, this was clearly such a case. 
Jd On this holding, our Supreme Court vacated the felony conviction. 
Schultz's circumstance is different than was Peterson's in a material way. In Peterson, 
the defendant satisfied his burden of proving the existence of a plea agreement contract and the 
issue presented was the scope of that agreement, which was ambiguous, and our Supreme Court 
resolved that ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Here, in contrast, the preliminary issue 
presented is whether Schultz proved that the parties' mutual intention was to enter into a binding 
plea agreement at the time of the juvenile waiver hearing. In this circumstance, Schultz is not 
entitled to resolution of ambiguity in his favor, instead he bears the initial burden of proving the 
existence of a contract and each essential fact, including mutual intent to contract. ld at 595, 
226 P.3d at 537. 
Here, the district court held, in essence, that that the plea "agreement" referred to by 
defense counsel at the juvenile waiver hearing was preliminary in nature and that no meeting of 
the minds occurred until the final plea agreement was entered before the trial court. The record 
supports the district court's conclusion. At the evidentiary hearing on Schultz's motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, it was established that there were four attorneys involved in Shultz's 
case: a juvenile prosecutor and a juvenile defense counsel, who handled only the juvenile waiver 
hearing, and a felony prosecutor and a felony defense counsel, who handled the case after 
juvenile jurisdiction was waived. The juvenile defense counsel testified that when reciting a 
contemplated plea agreement in juvenile court for the magistrate's information he sometimes 
was specific in detailing all the terms and sometimes merely provided a general summary of the 
plea agreement, but that he could not remember which occurred here. Juvenile defense counsel 
could not remember whether he ever had a conversation with the juvenile prosecutor regarding a 
plea agreement at all and the juvenile prosecutor could not remember having any such 
conversation. The juvenile prosecutor further testified that, although he was authorized to 
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negotiate plea agreements in criminal cases, he generally would not negotiate plea agreements in 
felony cases resulting from a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and that the felony prosecutor would 
be responsible for those negotiations. The felony prosecutor testified in concurrence with the 
juvenile prosecutor on these points.3 
In addition, at the hearing a written plea offer, prepared by the felony prosecutor prior to 
the juvenile waiver hearing, was placed in the record. The offer called for Schultz to waive 
juvenile jurisdiction, to waive his right to a preliminary hearing on the felonies, and to plead 
guilty at arraignment to battery with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), a deadly weapon 
enhancement on that charge, and to robbery. If all of these conditions were met, the written offer 
provided that in exchange the prosecution would, at sentencing, recommend concurrent unified 
sentences of twenty years, with five years fixed. However, neither the juvenile prosecutor nor 
the juvenile defense counsel could remember whether they saw this document or whether the 
juvenile defense counsel's recitation of the "agreement" at the waiver hearing was intended as a 
summary of that written offer. If so, it is uncontested that Schultz only performance in accord 
with that offer was to waive juvenile jurisdiction. He did not waive his preliminary hearing and 
he did not plead guilty to the specified charges at the district court arraignment. Instead, pretrial 
proceedings continued, including ongoing and numerous plea negotiations between the felony 
defense attorney and the felony prosecutor, necessitated largely by the fact that Schultz did not 
want to plead guilty to a sex offense. 
Further, the parties' actions at the district court level belie the conclusion that the parties 
had reached a final plea agreement resolution early on in the case. At the change of plea hearing 
before the district cOUli the terms of the plea agreement were placed in the record as follows: 
[PROSECUTOR]: The defendant is going to enter guilty pleas to three 
separate counts; robbery, which is Count V of the information; attempted rape, 
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which is Count VII; along with the enhanced penalty, which is Count VII [sic]. 
At the time of sentencing the state will recommend a sentence of 20 years 
fixed, and then it's free to recommend up to the maximum for an indeterminate 
period of time. And I guess another way of saying that is that the state can 
recommend up to 20 to life in this case. 
At the time of sentencing the remaining counts would be dismissed. 
Additionally, it's my understanding that with respect to Count VII, the defendant 
would be entering an Alford plea, but to the other counts, specifically the robbery, 
Felony defense counsel did not testify at the motion hearing. 
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the plea would be a straight up guilty plea. I believe that covers our plea 
agreement at this time. 
THE COURT: All right. If I understand correctly, Mr. Schultz, the state 
advises me that you're going to plead guilty to Count V, and Count V is robbery; 
and you're going to plead to Count VII, and Count VII is attempted rape; and 
you're going to plead to an enhanced penalty. 
The state--If you do that, the state's going to recommend 20 years fixed 
and some more, but they haven't told me how much more that would be 
indeterminate; and that you would be entering a North Carolina Alford plea on 
Count VII, attempted rape; and you would be pleading straight up to the robbery. 
Is that correct, [defense counsel]? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The only other term, the specific term and 
condition of the plea negotiations is that the defendant will be free to recommend 
whatever sentence he feels is appropriate at the time of sentencing. This is 
certainly not a stipulated sentence. I'll just leave it at that. Thank you, your 
Honor. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I did want to add one additional 
item for the record, and that is that as part of the plea negotiations, the state had 
specifically agreed to not attempt at any point in the future to file attempted 
murder charges against this defendant based upon the same set of facts and 
circumstances. 
After a break in the proceedings, the district court continued: 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Schultz, your lawyer is telling me that 
you now intend to enter a guilty plea, a North Carolina versus Alford guilty plea 
to Count V, robbery, to Count VII, attempted rape, with an enhanced penalty, 
count number eight. 
As I remember ... the prosecutor will be asking for 20 fixed, plus an 
unspecified indeterminate term. There's an agreement that no attempted murder 
charge would be filed and that your lawyer can argue to me any sentence you 
wish. Is that your understanding of the plea agreement? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
Thus, the felony prosecutor, felony defense counsel, the district court and Schultz all 
participated in the discussions. Unlike the prosecutor in Peterson, the felony defense counsel 
here did not stand silent, but instead clarified specific terms of the plea agreement, including that 
Schultz was free to argue for any sentence he felt was appropriate in recognition of the state's 
sentencing recommendation. Prior to entering his guilty pleas before the district court, Schultz 
filed no motion seeking enforcement of the earlier "agreement" that he now contends was final 
and binding, including at the felony change of plea hearing where the "contrary" terms of a plea 
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agreement were recited in full and complete detail. 4 In fact, there is no indication in the record 
that the earlier "agreement" was ever disclosed to the district court by counsel prior to Schultz 
entering his guilty plea. Instead, the juvenile waiver hearing "agreement" first came to light as 
an issue raised by appellate counsel during Schultz's direct appeal. Based on the foregoing, we 
affirm the district court's conclusion that Schultz had failed to meet his burden to show that the 
juvenile waiver hearing recitation was intended as a complete and final plea agreement. 5 
Schultz has failed to establish error in the district court's determination that defense 
counsel's juvenile waiver hearing recitation did not constitute a final plea agreement. 
Accordingly, the district court's denial of Schultz's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas is 
affirmed. 
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON CONCUR. 
4 Even assuming there was an "agreement" which led to Schultz WaIvmg juvenile 
jurisdiction, because Schultz suffered no significant detrimental reliance on the facts of this case, 
the parties here were free to continue negotiations and modify the first "agreement" or reach a 
second, different plea agreement for a final disposition of Schultz's case. 
5 At oral argument, Schultz contended that under the "plea agreement" entered into at the 
juvenile waiver hearing, he was free to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial then change 
his mind and "accept" the agreement in the middle of trial by pleading guilty to "some" of the 
charges. The inequity of this extreme result is readily apparent, as it defeats the general purpose 
of a plea agreement, which is to avoid the necessity of the jury trial in the first place. 
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